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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 14-1986 
_____________ 
 
SYLVIA RODRIGUEZ, 
                                Appellant 
 
v. 
 
RELIANCE STANDARD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-12–cv–04810) 
District Judge:   Honorable Susan D. Wigenton 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 12, 2015 
 
Before:   McKEE, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: April 14, 2015) 
__________ 
 
OPINION 
__________  
 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge.  
 Sylvia Rodriguez appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in 
favor of Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company on her claim that Reliance arbitrarily 
                                              
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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and capriciously determined that she was ineligible to continue to receive disability 
benefits.  Rodriguez argues that Reliance incorrectly determined that she was diagnosed 
with a mental or nervous disorder and that she did not meet the Plan’s definition of 
“totally disabled.”  Rodriguez also contends that she was denied procedural due process 
because Reliance failed to inform her of the evidence required to perfect her appeal.  We 
will affirm.1  
I. 
The facts of this case are explained in detail in Judge Cavanaugh’s Opinion and 
need not be repeated here.  Rodriguez v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., No. 2:12–cv–
04810, 2014 WL 347884, at *1–2 (D.N.J. Jan. 31, 2014).2 
In a thorough and well-reasoned Opinion, the district court properly noted that a 
denial of benefits claim brought under ERISA is evaluated by the district court under an 
“arbitrary and capricious standard” when, as here, “the plan grants the administrator 
discretionary authority.”  Id. at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Reliance’s Plan 
provided that “‘monthly benefits for total disability caused by or contributed to by Mental 
or Nervous disorders will not be payable beyond an aggregate lifetime maximum 
duration of twenty-four (24) months.’”  Id. at *4 (quoting AR0287).  The court evaluated 
the opinions of numerous doctors, their notes, and the medications they prescribed for 
anxiety, and it appropriately determined that the evidence was sufficient for Reliance to 
                                              
1 This court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
2 Judge Cavanaugh left the bench shortly after issuing the Order and the case was 
reassigned to Judge Wigenton.  Judge Wigenton also conducted a thorough analysis of 
the case and ultimately denied Rodriguez’s motion for reconsideration.  For purposes of 
this opinion, when we refer to the “district court’s Opinion” we mean Judge Cavanaugh.  
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conclude that Rodriguez’s condition was either caused by, or contributed to, a mental or 
nervous disorder.3  
The district court also carefully and completely explained its reasons for 
determining that Reliance’s termination of benefits was appropriate because Rodriguez 
no longer meets the Plan’s definition of “totally disabled.”  Under Reliance’s Plan, after 
twenty-four months of receiving benefits, the definition of “total disability” changes.  
After twenty-four months, the benefits recipient must prove that she “cannot perform the 
material duties of any occupation.”  App. 43.  The district court found “the reports of the 
five independent physicians to be sufficient evidence to support [Reliance’s] conclusion 
that [Rodriguez] was no longer Totally Disabled and its consequent decision to deny 
[Rodriguez] coverage beyond the initial 24 month period.”4 Rodriguez, 2014 WL 347884, 
at *4.  Accordingly, we will affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in the 
aforementioned Opinion of the district court.  
 Finally, the district court accurately determined that Rodriguez’s procedural due 
process rights were not violated.  As noted by the district court, the denial “letter 
                                              
3 Consistent with the district court, we note that there was no formal diagnosis of 
depression or anxiety.  Rather, there were prescriptions for anxiety medication and 
doctor’s notes describing the patient as “appear[ing] depressed during the examination 
and crying at times.”  App. 322.  In this case, such a diagnosis may be implied or inferred 
by treatment and prescription because of the numerous repeated references to these 
conditions by multiple healthcare providers.  However, though it was reasonable for 
Reliance to conclude that a mental disorder caused or contributed to Rodriguez’s 
condition, we caution that it will be a rare case where a medical condition is evident 
absent an actual diagnosis by a medical professional. 
4 Judge Wigenton similarly found that Rodriguez’s benefits were not extended, “in part, 
because the standard of approval became stricter and [Rodriguez] no longer qualified for 
benefits.”  Rodriguez v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., No. 2:12–cv–04810, 2014 WL 
1494523, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 16, 2014). 
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identified the policy provisions that were relied on. . . . summarized the bases for the 
claim . . . noted the lack of abnormal findings that would support [Rodriguez’s] claim of 
continuing disability. . . . [and] advised [Rodriguez] of her right to appeal the decision.”  
Rodriguez, 2014 WL 347884, at *6.  The letter clearly explained what “information [was] 
necessary for [Rodriguez] to perfect [her] claim” and did not deny Rodriguez of 
procedural due process.  29 C.F.R. § 2560.503–1(g)(1)(iii).  Accordingly, we will affirm 
the decision of the district court substantially for the reasons set forth in its Opinion 
without further elaboration.  
II. 
 For the reasons expressed above, we will affirm the grant of summary judgment in 
favor of Reliance and the denial of Rodriguez’s cross motion for summary judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
